Can “raising fees” be deducted for income tax purposes?

By Hylton Cameron, Director

A judgment dealing with this rather contentious issue was handed down last month by the Supreme Court of Appeal in CSARS v Cornucopia Trust (469/2025) [2026] ZASCA 116 (7 September 2026) (“Cornucopia Trust”).

In short, the court held that raising fees are tax deductible! (with 4 judges concurring and 1 judge dissenting). Initially I was not sure if I agreed, even if I liked the outcome!

At issue was whether finance charges which in this case were “raising fees”, were “similar” to interest. This is per the definition of “interest” in section 24J of the Income Tax Act. If such raising fees were similar, they would be regarded as interest and would be tax deductible.

The current definition of “interest” is (I have not provided the full definition, and have added my emphasis):

“Interest includes the

(a)    gross amount of any interest or similar finance charges….”.

Previously, the equivalent wording in the definition of “interest” read as follows (once again, with my emphasis added):

“Interest includes the

(a)    gross amount of any interest or related finance charges….”.

The definition of interest was amended after the Supreme Court of Appeal case CSARS v Custodial Services (Pty) Ltd [2012] 2 All SA 237, which allowed various “related charges” (per the previous definition) as deductible “interest”. These included guarantee fees, financial advisory fees and legal fees, among others.

In Cornucopia Trust, the court agreed that the current definition which used “similar” was more restrictive than “related” but this did not mean that finance charges (the raising fees) had to be identical to interest.

Further, (our emphasis):

“It is the change in wording from related in the old Act to similar in the amendment, and the meaning to be attributed thereto, that lies at the heart of this appeal. Neither related finance charges nor similar finance charges are defined in the Act.”

The tax court had found in favour of Cornucopia, with an interesting point that if there is an irresoluble ambiguity, the contra fiscum rule  should apply in favour of the taxpayer. The contra fiscum rule means that where there is doubt as to the meaning of a statutory provision which imposes a burden, this must be resolved by construing the provision in favour of the subject (the taxpayer in this instance), provided it is reasonably capable of that construction.

On the facts it was not necessary to apply the rule as the most compelling and coherent account was to interpret the raising fees to be similar to interest.

SARS’ Interpretation Note 142 (“the IN”) states that raising fees are the cost of raising capital, while interest is the payment for the use of capital, and therefore that raising fees are not similar to interest.

Per the case, SARS accepted it cannot rely on the IN. SARS argued raising fees lack the fundamental characteristics of interest (in summary): they were upfront, once off charges incurred before the loan became effective and paid for the arrangement of loans, rather than the use of money. They were not linked to the time value of money, nor were they compensation linked to the outstanding capital.

Cornucopia accepted that the new definition is more restrictive.

Its argument was that raising fees are an economic reality of raising finance that unlocked the funds. The raising fees were inextricably linked to obtaining the loan and must be a finance charge which is similar to interest, being a cost of credit.  

Per the majority, the amendment from “related” to “similar” would remove certain fees e.g. legal fees, but the word “similar” would be broad enough to allow raising fees, such raising fees being a necessary consideration for obtaining the loan. Such raising fee is similar in character to interest. Where the raising fee is directly proportional to the loan, it is an indivisible cost of raising credit.

The Supreme Court then provided the following important (in my view) comments and excerpts from cases, in different parts of the judgment:

“This Court, in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A) at 298 F-G (“Genn”) found that raising fees were deductible together with interest as they formed one consideration…

Thus, while interest reflects the time value of money plus the quid pro quo for the lender’s forbearance in awaiting repayment at a later date, these are not the only characteristics of interest. Interest is the functional cost of credit - what it costs the lender to provide the credit, together with a margin. Interest is not only the time value of the loan but also compensation for the risk involved. This is borne out by higher interest rates for higher risk loans. In this scenario interest is the agreed consideration to the lender for the extension of credit…

The purpose of amending related to similar was not to confine deductibility to the most obscure forms of finance charges. Instead, it was to circumvent the wide approach adopted by this Court in Custodial Services. It was not to eliminate every fee other than interest but to ensure that fees such as legal fees, financial advisory fees and other fees relating to the loan, but not strictly necessary for the loan, were excised from falling within the s 24J deduction.”

Finally, in my view, the most substantial point was:

“If the credit would not be granted absent the raising fee, then, together with interest, it constitutes the necessary consideration for the loan. As such it has the same function as interest in the provision of credit and creates a direct link between the raising fee and the use of capital. If interest is compensation for the time value of the money as well as the risk taken by the lender in providing the loan, then the raising fee is similar in character. The raising fees in this particular case share the same characteristics as interest in that they are payments to mitigate the risk of non-repayment of the loan, in addition to compensation for the deprivation of the use of the money. In these circumstances where the raising fee is directly proportionate to the amount of the loan it is not merely consideration for work done in providing, arranging, or setting up the loan, but the indivisible cost of the raising of credit, payable by the borrower to the lender as compensation for using its money, which bears the same characteristics as interest.”

The judgment continues and states that the sum of the raising fee was directly linked to the interest rate charged and to the period of the facility.  

Further, the practical effect (which does potentially give SARS some breathing space for raising fees) is that raising fees that are charged merely for the efforts associated with obtaining the loan, would be related fees. But raising fees that are strictly linked to the procurement of the loan, both in amount and objective, and compensate the lender for the risk and cost involved in being deprived of its money, would fall within the rubric of similar. 

Various points were then raised against the dissenting judgment with the final point being that the raising fees in this particular case are linked to the period of the facility and were negotiated with reference to the time value for money (again this is not a blanket concession for all raising fees).

The dissenting judgment, said that this question is a matter of interpretation, and that one needs to check text, context and purpose.

Now what?

From the points raised above, on balance, despite my initial misgivings (for what it is worth) and on the facts, I agree with the court. However, importantly, this is not an approval for the deductibility of all raising fees. One needs to understand how and why such fees were incurred! 

If one falls into the box (per the points above) of such raising fees being similar to interest, one should be safe.

Finally, while not confirmed we have heard that SARS is taking the matter on appeal, so I would still be wary of claiming such costs without proper investigation!